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Abstract Purpose and meaning are necessary concepts for understanding mind and culture, but appear 
to be absent from the physical world and are not part of the explanatory framework of the natural 
sciences. Understanding how meaning (in the broad sense of the term) could arise from a physical 
world has proven to be a tough problem. The basic scheme of Darwinian evolution produces 
adaptations that only represent apparent (“as if”) goals and meaning. Here I use evolutionary models 
to show that a slight, evolvable extension of the basic scheme is sufficient to produce genuine goals. 
The extension, targeted modulation of mutation rate, is known to be generally present in biological 
cells, and gives rise to two phenomena that are absent from the non-living world: intrinsic meaning 
and the ability to initiate goal-directed chains of causation (active causation). The extended scheme 
accomplishes this by utilizing randomness modulated by a feedback loop that is itself regulated by 
evolutionary pressure. The mechanism can be extended to behavioural variability as well, and thus 
shows how freedom of behaviour is possible. A further extension to communication suggests that the 
active exchange of intrinsic meaning between organisms may be the origin of consciousness, which in 
combination with active causation can provide a physical basis for the phenomenon of free will. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Science maintains two different views on the world. The natural sciences see a physical world 
composed of energy and matter, whereas the fields studying mind and culture see a human world 
composed of purposeful behaviour and meaning (in the broad sense of the term, see Sect. 5). While 
the physical world is thought to be governed by mechanistic processes without purpose, the human 
world can only be understood when meaning and the active pursuit of goals are acknowledged as real 
phenomena. Darwin's theory of evolution showed how complex life-forms can evolve from simpler 
ones (Darwin 1859), and thus promised to connect the physical and human worlds. However, the 
origin of purpose and meaning is still not understood. The fundamental problem is that Darwinian 
evolution itself is a physical process, devoid of meaning. It is not clear if and how a physical process 
can generate phenomena that appear to be non-physical.  
Here I present a toy model that generates meaning and goal-directedness as adaptations 
evolvable by Darwinian evolution. The model is intended as a proof of concept, not as a specific 
model of the processes involved. It contains the bare minimum required for Darwinian evolution, 
highlighting its causal structure. Lacking molecular details, the model should be equally applicable to 
chemically different life-forms that may have evolved on other planets than Earth (Bedau and Cleland 
2010; van Hateren 2013). 
Although the model only has direct empirical support from known molecular processes that 
regulate the mutation rate of biological cells, its basic mechanism (an evolutionary controlled 
feedback process modulating randomness) can be extended to shorter timescales than those of 
evolution. In particular, behavioural modifications that take place within the lifespan of an organism 
can be controlled by a similar mechanism, which thus leads to goal-directed behaviour with some 
degree of freedom, i.e., a form of agency. Extending the mechanism to communication between 
organisms suggests a plausible link with consciousness and free will. 
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The article is organized as follows, in order to enhance readability. The main ideas are presented 
primarily through text and figures in Sect. 2 (“Results”), Sect. 3 (“Discussion”), and in Figs. 1-3. 
Equations, and figures that illustrate or extend the main ideas (Figs. 4-10) are in Sect. 4 (“Methods”). 
Terminology is discussed in some depth in Sect. 5 (“Appendix”). In places in Sect. 2 and 3 where is 
referred to equations and figures in Sect. 4, this is not essential for following the line of argument, and 
the reader may prefer to skip these forward references on first reading. 
 
2 Results 
 
In this section the origin of meaning and active causation is first explained for hereditary change on an 
evolutionary timescale, with as unit the organismal lineage (here defined as a particular line of 
descent of organisms). Subsequently, these ideas are extended to behavioural change on the timescale 
of an organism's lifetime, with as unit the single organism. In the latter case, active causation takes the 
form of agency, the property of organisms that their behaviour is neither fully determined nor random, 
but changes in a way that is at the same time unpredictable and under control of the organism itself, 
thus providing the organism with a limited form of behavioural freedom (Heisenberg 2009; Brembs 
2011). 
 
2.1 Active causation of heredity 
 
The basic Darwinian model of evolution (Fig. 1a) assumes a population of organisms, with n(h,t) the 
number of organisms of hereditary type h at time t. Each organism has a typical lifetime τH and 
produces, on average per lifetime, f offspring, with f(h,t) defined here as the organism's fitness. Note 
that fitness thus defined is a predictive, probabilistic variable, which varies during the lifetime of a 
particular organism, for example when circumstances deteriorate or improve. It can best be seen as an 
instantaneous reproductive rate, normalized by lifetime. The number of organisms of type h is 
multiplied by f and thus gradually changes. Without mutation, the number of type h would rise 
exponentially as long as h has f>1, whereas f<1 leads to decline and eventual extinction. The positive 
feedback loop (I) is the main engine of life because of its potential for exponential growth, but it is 
inherently unstable. A second, negative feedback loop (II) provides stabilization: because of limited 
resources, the fitness of all types declines when the total number of organisms N approaches the 
environment's carrying capacity, for example when food or space becomes scarce. The fitness of some 
types h consequently drops below one and the numbers of those types decrease, with steady or 
increasing numbers of the other types (natural selection). The result is a change in distribution of 
types h. 
The model has two external inputs, an environmental variable E and a mutation rate λH. E(t) 
varies randomly over a wide range of temporal scales (Sect. 4, Fig. 4), both slower and faster than τH. 
The fitness of type h declines with the distance between h and E (Sect. 4, Eq. (2)), and E(t) therefore 
drives changes in n(h,t). Types h can change into other types by mutation at a rate λH, spreading a 
particular type h gradually to neighbouring types. 
The organismal lineage has only a passive role in basic Darwinian evolution. It is driven by 
mechanistic feedback loops (I and II) and by external influences beyond its control (E and stochastic 
processes producing mutations). Changes in fitness, heredity, and type distribution are produced, then, 
by forms of causation that are passive from the point of view of the organismal lineage. Moreover, the 
evolutionary process has no foresight or goal. When it produces organisms with adaptations matched 
to their current environment, it is because such adaptations happened to promote fitness in previous 
environments and E(t) contains slow components remaining approximately the same over many τH. 
Although adaptations may be perceived, post hoc, as goal-directed ones produced by a goal-directed 
process, either goal-directness is only apparent (“as if”). It is sometimes assumed that basic Darwinian 
evolution implies that high fitness and survival are genuine intrinsic goals of organisms, or even that 
self-maintenance as such is an intrinsic goal of life. However, this tacitly assumes that existing is 
better than not existing, a value judgment inapplicable to regular physical systems (Davies 2009), as 
they lack value to themselves. 
The above analysis changes dramatically, however, when the basic Darwinian scheme is slightly 
extended. This extension provides the organisms of a lineage with some control over their own 
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mutation rate. Such controls exist as a general feature of cells (Galhardo et al. 2007), observable as 
increased mutation rates in cells under stress, for example because of a shortage of nutrients or the 
presence of toxins. Although a higher mutation rate produces many nonviable offspring, it also 
increases the probability of a mutation that lets its carrier survive the stress, multiply, and thereby 
increase the chances that at least one of its lines of descent will survive (Ram and Hadany 2012). Note 
that this internal form of controlling mutation rate during the organism's lifetime is different from 
mutator alleles being selected (Taddei et al. 1997), which is externally driven (see further Sect. 3). 
The consequences of a mutation rate under control of the organisms in a lineage can be 
understood from the following, hypothetical example. Suppose that the mutation rate is controlled by 
a function g, so it is given by λH(g). In principle, g can take any form. Suppose it depends on heredity 
h, with h not only determining fitness, but also another property unrelated to fitness. For example, at 
regularly spaced positions along the h-axis organisms are slightly larger than for other h. If the former 
values of h produce a smaller λH than the latter (Fig. 1b, lower panel), the population accumulates at 
the former ones because mutation away from those values is slower than from the other ones (Fig. 1b, 
upper panel). Even though the size variations produce no fitness change and the mutations are 
undirected (not changing h in a specific direction), there is a clear, directed effect on the distribution 
of types h. The function g, which is intrinsic to the organisms of a lineage, thus determines the 
probability of obtaining specific values of h. It can therefore be viewed as an implicit goal of the 
Fig. 1 Population models of basic and extended Darwinian evolution. (a) Basic model. Fitness f modifies the 
number of organisms n multiplicatively (symbol ×), a mutation rate characterized by λH modifies the 
distribution of types (convolution symbol ∗), and τH is the typical lifetime of an organism. See text for 
further explanation and Sect. 4.1 for details. (b) Modulating λH as a comb function of h (lower panel) 
produces a comb-like population density (upper panel). The goal-function is such that one in four values of 
h has λH=0.5, and the others λH=3.5. The figure shows the result after 1000 time steps (10τH), typical of the 
result for any time after an initial spin-up time of a few τH. Labels at the tick marks (h: 10, 20, 30; λH=0, 2, 
4; n: 0, 500, 1000) are partly suppressed for the sake of clarity. (c) Extended model. An estimate of its own 
fitness made by the organism, Hˆf , is used to modulate λH. See text for explanation and consequences, and 
Sect. 4.2 for details. (d) Ratios of population numbers N of 100 pairs of competing populations, one always 
following the extended model and the other the basic model over a range of λH,fixed. Results after 300τH 
(open grey symbols) and 600τH (black dots). The results show that the extended model is evolvable 
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organism and its lineage, because g influences the future heredity of the organismal lineage in a 
directed way. 
The above example is unlikely to evolve because it does not increase fitness. Even if it would 
evolve by chance, it would be unsustainable on an evolutionary time scale, because it is at a 
disadvantage relative to lineages that do not spend resources on a property that is irrelevant to fitness. 
An evolvable and sustainable goal-function must improve fitness, and in its purest form must make λH 
a function of an estimate Hˆf  of the fitness of the organism, thus )ˆ(λ HH f  (Fig. 1c). This is indeed an 
evolvable strategy: taking a mutation rate λH that decreases as a function of estimated fitness Hˆf  (high 
fitness implies low mutation rate, and vice versa, Sect. 4, Eq. (6)) produces a population of organisms 
that outperforms populations with λH fixed (Fig. 1d). For each value of λH,fixed in Fig. 1d, a simulation 
was performed with two competing populations, one population following the extended model (with 
modulated λH) and the other the basic model (with fixed λH). The ratio of the total number of 
organisms in each population fluctuates, but gradually the organisms of the extended model drive 
those of the basic model to extinction (thus the ratio Nλ,fixed/ Nλ,modulated goes to zero, as illustrated by 
the ratio after 300 and 600 lifetimes, circles and dots, respectively; results are for 100 different 
simulations for a range of values of λH,fixed). The function Hˆf  thus produces a goal-directedness in the 
lineage and its organisms that is itself evolvable by the basic Darwinian scheme. The goal evolves in 
the extended Darwinian scheme by piggybacking on the basic scheme, and aligning itself with it.  
The true fitness f is unlikely to be known exactly to a real-world organism (i.e., more realistic 
than the toy organisms modelled here), because for that it would need to make an accurate simulation 
of itself and its interactions with other evolving organisms and the environment. Although organisms 
indeed appear to spend a significant part of their physiological and neural resources on inferring the 
states of themselves and their environment, for example their internal nutritional state or dangerous 
external factors, producing the estimate Hˆf  ultimately requires evolved heuristics (short-cuts and 
rules of thumb). Nevertheless, Hˆf  is under selection pressure to provide an estimate as close to f as 
possible, given the physiological constraints of the organism. The model calculations presented here 
assume that the toy organisms can make an estimate Hˆf  that is arbitrarily close to f  (by knowing or 
observing their own type h, by having evolved a sensor that measures E(t), and by approximating the 
mapping of Eq. (2) by an evolved physiological or neural model), but this is not a crucial assumption. 
Even if Hˆf  is not optimal and deviates somewhat from f, similar results as in Fig. 1d are obtained 
(Sect. 4.2; see further Sect. 3 for discussion). Note that f (and by implication Hˆf ) is not a constant but 
a function of time, changing continually because it depends on the momentary environment E(t) and 
the variable population size N(t) (Sect. 4, Eq. (2)). Both f and Hˆf  are predictive variables, related to 
an expected reproductive rate of each organism, with actually realized reproduction varying 
stochastically. 
The extended Darwinian scheme not only produces a goal-directedness in the organisms of a 
lineage, but also changes the nature of the causality of the process. Causation in nature can be quite 
complex, but it is useful to distinguish two basic variants, deterministic and stochastic causation. In 
deterministic causation, systems evolve in a predictable way, with one part of the system influenced 
by and influencing other parts through fixed relationships. Chains of causation are mere continuations 
of existing chains, no new chains are started. In stochastic causation, new chains of causation are 
initiated by definition, because the stochastic variables have no specific (identifiable) cause. Physical 
sources of stochastic causation are thermal and quantum noise (see also Sect. 4), and thermal noise is 
indeed the primary source of stochasticity for mutations. The mutations as produced by λH in the basic 
Darwinian scheme of Fig. 1a are the result of stochastic causation. In contrast, the modulated 
mutation rate )ˆ(λ HH f  of the extended Darwinian scheme (Fig. 1c) is rather special, producing what 
might be called modulated stochastic causation. Effectively, it is equivalent to a non-negative 
deterministic variable ( Hˆf ) modulating the expected variance of the resulting mutations (in the toy 
model here along a single dimension, in reality in some high-dimensional space). Only the variance is 
modulated, not the mean, because modulating the mean would imply a directionality for which the 
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organism would have no justification (the organism cannot foresee the effects of mutations on 
fitness).  
The modulated stochastic causation produced by )ˆ(λ HH f  mixes deterministic causation (through 
H
ˆf driving variance) and stochastic causation (through random mutation). This would be rather 
uninteresting, were it not that it occurs in a feedback loop operating at the scale of an organismal 
lineage. The random mutations change an organism's descendant such that fitness is (usually) changed 
as well, such a fitness change is then reflected in the descendant's estimate of its own fitness, this self-
estimated fitness subsequently influences the expected variance of mutations, the resulting mutations 
subsequently change the fitness of the next descendant in a lineage, and so on and so forth. The result 
is that the deterministic and stochastic causation become thoroughly entangled: fitness at a particular 
point in time is dependent on the complete fitness history of the lineage (and thereby on the history of 
the environment E) and on the complete history of the realizations of mutational stochasticity. 
Because mutational stochasticity depends on fitness, it therefore also depends, at a particular point in 
time, on the complete history of fitness, on E(t), and on previous stochastic realizations. This is in 
stark contrast to the mutational stochasticity in the basic Darwinian scheme of Fig. 1a, which is not 
modified by fitness (i.e., not by fitness f or Hˆf  as the predictive, probabilistic variables defined here, 
although it may depend on fitness outcomes, actual realizations of fitness, for example when mutator 
alleles are promoted, in hindsight, by natural selection). The common assumption made in modelling 
that noise is independent from realization to realization (or has a limited correlation time as in 
coloured noise), and that it is independent of the signal, is thus strongly invalidated by this scheme. 
The effect is that fitness and mutations become strongly intertwined, and the causation should 
therefore be seen as a unique form, midway between deterministic and stochastic. The regular forms 
of deterministic and stochastic causation one finds in nature can be called “passive”, because things 
just happen as they do, either in a determined or spontaneous way. In contrast, the entangled form of 
causation described here will be called “active causation”, because of the crucial role the organisms of 
a lineage play in steering stochasticity and therefore in steering the resulting hereditary trajectories, as 
shown below. Hereditary trajectories describe the path that subsequent organisms in a lineage take 
through hereditary space. In Sect. 5 the use of the terms “active” and “passive” is discussed further. 
In summary, the basic idea that underlies active causation is that mutation rates (resulting in 
random fluctuations) are actively determined by an estimated fitness function such that mutation rates 
are greater in areas of low expected fitness. Heuristically, this causes the dispersion of phenotypes 
from regimes with low fitness thereby ensuring that these regimes are avoided (like evacuation by 
local diffusion, as illustrated in Fig. 1b). This means that active causation can prescribe regions of 
fitness space that are more likely to be occupied – regions that have a low dispersion (a low mutation 
rate) because of their high estimated fitness. 
The difference between causation in the basic and extended Darwinian schemes can be 
illustrated by simulating the evolution of lineages (Fig. 2a), and comparing how lineages would 
evolve under the two schemes. When a specific hereditary change ∆h occurs, it could be the result of 
either the extended Darwinian scheme (λH,modulated) or the basic one (λH,fixed). The likelihood ratio is the 
ratio of the probability of ∆h given modulated λH, P(∆h| λH,modulated), and the probability of ∆h given 
fixed λH, P(∆h| λH,fixed). This likelihood ratio is expected to be larger than one, on average, if ∆h was 
actually produced by the extended rather than the basic scheme, but for individual steps in ∆h the ratio 
is too variable to show the difference. However, for an organismal lineage the sequence of individual 
steps produces a total likelihood ratio that is the product of the likelihood ratios of individual steps. 
The likelihood ratio of hereditary trajectories (10log shown in Fig. 2b) typically rises to high values, 
more quickly so at times when fitness is low. This means that h-trajectories produced by the extended 
scheme could not have been produced by organisms that keep λH fixed. Such an h-trajectory is 
therefore partly, but observably, caused by how the organisms of the lineage estimate Hˆf , and not any 
more only the result of passive causes as in the basic Darwinian scheme. Calling this form of 
causation active emphasizes this difference. Each step is random, and thus provides an element of 
unpredictability, but the trajectory as a whole is not random. It is the result of permanent changes in 
heredity continually guided by a feedback loop acting through h and Hˆf , and is thus dependent on 
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previous (unpredictable) changes in h as well as on the goal function Hˆf . A trajectory is therefore 
neither completely predictable, because of the stochastic nature of mutation, nor completely 
unpredictable, because it is partly determined by each organism in the lineage through its estimate Hˆf  
of its own fitness. The computation of the likelihood ratio as performed here is not an essential part of 
the model, but simply serves to show that the influence of the goal function Hˆf  on h-trajectories is not 
instantaneous, but gradually increases, up to a point where it is fully obvious. 
Because the organismal lineage has an active role in determining an h-trajectory, the intrinsic 
goal-directedness produced by Hˆf  should be seen as a genuine goal. By internalizing the true fitness f 
as an estimate Hˆf , and utilizing that estimate in a feedback loop as explained above, the “as if” goal 
of basic Darwinian evolution is transformed into a genuine goal. Note, however, that this only applies 
to the intrinsic goal-directedness of the organisms in a lineage, the other parts of the evolutionary 
process remain invariably without goal. The above analysis shows that letting λH depend on Hˆf  has 
two consequences. First, it makes high fitness a genuine goal of the organisms in a lineage, and 
second, it gives them, through their lineage, an active role in its destiny. Actively pursuing a goal 
implies that reaching that goal is important to the organisms. The goal is embodied in the detailed 
form of Hˆf  and is denoted here by the term “intrinsic meaning”. Meaning is used here not in the 
narrow sense (as in the meaning of a word) but in the broad sense (as in the meaning of an action or 
the meaning of life), implying significance, value, import, and purpose (see Sect. 5 for a discussion of 
this terminology). 
 
2.2 Active causation of behaviour and dialogue 
 
Hereditary variations only allow adaptations to variations of E(t) much slower than τH. An organism 
can adapt to faster changes of E(t) as well by changing during its lifetime. Such changes are called 
here “behaviour”, used broadly, including changes that occur within cells and in immobile organisms. 
Active causation and intrinsic meaning are produced by analogy with the extended Darwinian scheme 
(Fig. 3a). Different behaviours b have a typical lifetime τB (<<τH) and lie along the same scale as h 
and E, with fitness depending on the distance between (h+b) and E(t) (Sect. 4, Eq. (8)). Variation in 
behaviour is driven by λB, which may originate from molecular stochastic processes (Faisal et al. 
Fig. 2 Organismal lineages are partly determined by 
H
ˆf . (a) Equivalent of Fig. 1c for computing h-
trajectories, with an h-trajectory the trajectory through 
hereditary space of a lineage, a line of descending 
organisms. R are random generators, ∆n is the realized 
number of offspring of an organism, ∆h the change in 
heredity (relative to the parent) of a particular 
descendant, and ∆tH the lifetime of that organism. 
When ∆n=0 the trajectory dies, when ∆n >1 it splits. 
For details see Sect. 4.3. (b) Likelihood ratios of h-
trajectories Π∆hP(∆h| λH,modulated)/ P(∆h| λH,fixed) 
typically rise to high values. Grey lines: 167 
trajectories at end point, black line: mean, broken line: 
mean of theoretically expected likelihood ratios (Eq. 
(7)). The increasing likelihood ratios show that h-
trajectories gradually become nearly completely 
determined by the goal function Hˆf , even if this only 
involves random hereditary changes. See text for 
further explanation and Sect. 4.4 for details 
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2008). The probability distribution of b given h and t determines which behaviours are present in the 
population. Populations that modulate λB using a fitness estimate Bˆf  outperform populations with 
fixed λB (Sect. 4, Fig. 6), and the scheme is therefore evolvable. The b-trajectories (consisting of 
consecutive behaviours) of particular organisms (model shown in Fig. 5, Sect. 4) are only compatible 
with modulated λB (Fig. 3b). This shows that the organism determines the trajectory in a decisive way, 
through Bˆf , even if the details of the behaviour are unpredictable. Because, similarly to Hˆf , also Bˆf  
is under evolutionary pressure to align itself with f, high Bˆf represents a goal for the organism. The 
feedback scheme also produces active causation as before, but now on a behavioural timescale. This 
produces a form of agency in the organism, with some behavioural freedom produced because the 
unpredictability of behaviour associated with stochasticity is modulated, and thus partly controlled, by 
the organism itself, through Bˆf . The organism therefore actively pursues genuine goals on a 
behavioural timescale similarly as the organismal lineage does on an evolutionary timescale. 
Although the overall goal is high Bˆf  (and, by implication, high f), this will in practice consist of a 
package of sub-goals, such as finding food and avoiding danger, all expected to contribute to the 
overall goal. 
Organisms with advanced nervous systems can go one step further by first simulating the 
expected fitness consequences ( Mˆf ) of behavioural alternatives m before choosing a specific 
behaviour b (model shown in Fig. 7, Sect. 4). Again, populations that actively modulate λM 
outperform populations that do not (Sect. 4, Fig. 8), and display active causation (Sect. 4, model in 
Fig. 9 and trajectories in Fig. 10). Because the consequences of potential behaviours are evaluated 
beforehand, the behaviour can be viewed as purposeful rather than just goal-directed. 
Finally, organisms may communicate in order to coordinate their behaviour and thereby increase 
fitness. One possibility is to communicate through stereotypical signs that the other organism uses as 
auxiliary input to its Mˆf , with its behaviour influenced by the resulting change in the value of Mˆf . 
Communication in insects, such as by the honey-bee's dance, is presumably of this type. No intrinsic 
meaning is transferred, the communicated signs merely utilize the other organism's Mˆf , with its 
implied intrinsic meaning. 
Fig. 3 Behavioural extension of active 
causation. (a) Behaviour b adapts during the 
lifetime of an organism, in addition to the 
adaptation of h on an evolutionary timescale. 
The probability density of b for each h, P(b|h,t) 
is varied through )ˆ(λ BB f , with ),,(ˆB tbhf  
fitness estimated by the organism; τB is the 
typical lifetime of a specific behaviour, with for 
the calculations defaults τB=4 and τH=100 (in 
time step units). (b) Likelihood ratios of b-
trajectories Π∆bP(∆b| λB,modulated)/ P(∆b| λB,fixed) 
typically rise to high values. Shown are 
observed (grey) and expected (black) ratios of 
all b-trajectories in a 5τH interval of three 
different h-trajectories. The increasing 
likelihood ratios show that b-trajectories 
gradually become nearly completely determined 
by the goal function Bˆf , even if this only 
involves random behavioural changes. See text 
for explanation and Sect. 4.5 for details 
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A more sophisticated possibility is letting communication modify the very form of Mˆf . 
Changing the form of Mˆf  implies changing the intrinsic meaning it embodies. This type of 
communication then exchanges, in effect, intrinsic meaning between organisms, entangling their 
active causation. An example is presumably the nonverbal dialogue accompanying mother-offspring 
bonds in mammals, and particularly in humans (Trevarthen and Aitken 2001). Intrinsic meaning is a 
real phenomenon, on a par with any other aspect of the physical world, even if it only occurs in 
specialized, living forms of matter. In most organisms, it is presumably present only implicitly, 
distributed over many variables. However, once it becomes part of a dialogue, it needs to be made 
explicit and coded into behaviour, and the other organism needs to perceive and decode it, and 
assimilate it into its own intrinsic meaning. I conjecture that the process of extracting and assimilating 
intrinsic meaning during dialogue manifests itself as consciousness. The intuition here is that transfer 
of a real physical phenomenon (intrinsic meaning) gives rise to another real physical phenomenon 
(consciousness), somewhat analogous to how transfer of charge gives rise to a magnetic field even 
without an actual current (as in Maxwell's displacement current). Initially occurring only between two 
individuals, it may gradually extend, through development and learning, to more complex forms 
(Reddy 2003), such as nonverbal dialogue with another individual about objects (Tomasello and 
Carpenter 2007), nonverbal dialogue with internalized versions of others and the shared world, and 
with an internalized version of the self (Mead 1934). The scope for exchanging intrinsic meaning 
obviously expands considerably once the transition from nonverbal to verbal dialogue is made (van 
Hateren 2014). Finally, the combination of consciousness and active, goal-directed behaviour and 
dialogue can provide a physical mechanism for free will. 
 
3 Discussion 
 
The models presented here show how life can evolve two phenomena that are absent from the non-
living world, but appear to be present in all current life-forms (van Hateren 2013). First, it evolved an 
active form of causation, enabling organismal lineages and organisms to initiate and pursue 
trajectories of heredity, behaviour, planned behaviour, and dialogue. Second, life evolved intrinsic 
meaning as embodied in the way organisms estimate their own fitness. Serving only as proofs of 
concept, the models ignore many aspects of existing life that are known to be important in evolution 
(Pigliucci and Müller 2010), development, and learning (Dehaene and Changeux 2000). Analysing the 
consequences and validity of the ideas presented here for more realistic models, and performing 
experimental tests, is evidently an extensive research program. However, the concepts of active 
causation and intrinsic meaning are based on such fundamental considerations that confidence in their 
robustness is justified.  
The arguments presented here suggest that agency and intrinsic meaning are emergent properties 
when hereditary or behavioural variability is based on an organism's estimation of its own fitness. 
With respect to hereditary variability, this is closely related to second-order selection, selection for 
properties enhancing evolutionary potential (see e.g. Kauffman 1993). However, when this selection 
works for example on mutator alleles (Taddei et al. 1997), with the hindsight of natural selection, the 
causation is merely passive. In the extended scheme of Fig. 1c, causation is active because it involves 
a predictive estimate of fitness, made by the lineage's organisms themselves and utilized in a feedback 
loop that transforms the randomness of hereditary change into goal-driven hereditary trajectories. 
Similarly, a behavioural feedback loop incorporating self-estimated fitness leads to goal-driven 
behavioural trajectories of an organism. Although the simulations used an estimate fˆ  identical to f, 
the scheme is still fundamentally different from one implementing passive second-order selection. In 
passive second-order selection, the mutation rate (as set by mutator alleles) is established by natural 
selection, thus after the fact (based on a realized fitness outcome, not a predictive one). In contrast, the 
fitness fˆ  in the scheme of Fig. 1c is an estimate of a predictive, probabilistic variable, f, and it is 
therefore also predictive and probabilistic, with “as if” foresight. The foresight is not real, of course, 
because that would conflict with causality. Rather, it is based on implicit statistical knowledge the 
organismal lineage has acquired through previous natural selection (or, for behaviour, through 
previous development and learning as guided by criteria acquired through previous natural selection). 
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In this article it was assumed that organisms evolved reasonable estimates fˆ  of their true fitness 
f, through regular evolutionary mechanisms. For the toy model it was assumed that fˆ  could be 
approximated by f (as would indeed be easy for the toy organisms given the simplicity of their fitness 
function), but it is likely that also organisms in the wild can readily evolve practical ways to estimate 
and internalize f. Nevertheless, it is a deep and interesting question if there are optimal ways for 
organisms to make estimates of f, if such estimates are subject to theoretical bounds, and to what 
extent actual organisms reach those bounds. An organism can obtain high fitness by two basic factors, 
self-maintenance and reproduction. When self-maintenance is too weak, the organism will die before 
it can reproduce. When reproduction is too weak, the organism will be the last of its lineage. Self-
maintenance is related to homeostasis and autopoiesis, and, according to the good regulator theorem 
(Conant and Ashby 1970), a good regulator (or homeostat) has to model its environment and how it is 
affected by it. It is clear that such a model must, implicitly, play an important role in estimating fitness 
as well. Thus internalizing f as a model fˆ  that can predict the environment, as part of its capabilities, 
is consistent with regulating well. Indeed, there is a venerable research tradition in neuroscience and 
machine learning that focusses on making such inferences by utilizing Bayesian methods. A recent 
formulation in terms of minimizing free energy (Friston and Stephan 2007; Friston 2010) unifies 
earlier approaches with respect to sensory perception (such as predictive coding and maximization of 
mutual information) with action (behaviour) as a means of increasing perceptual predictability. An 
interesting possibility is that the feedback schemes presented here might be used as effective 
mechanisms for optimising variational free energy through selection at evolutionary or somatic 
timescales. This would require that fitness can be specified by the states that constitute an organism's 
goals. Alternatively, minimizing free energy may then be seen as an optimal strategy by which an 
organism could estimate its own fitness, an upper bound that can be compared with the (possibly 
contingent) strategy actually realized in the biological system. A caveat here is that informational 
approaches, such as the free energy principle, generally assume ergodicity, whereas the current 
schemes presumably produce organismal lineages and organisms with non-ergodic properties: their 
state space changes over time as organisms innovate by reconstructing themselves through genetic, 
physiological, and social mechanisms. Reconstructing fˆ  by social bonding is conjectured (Sect. 2.2) 
to be associated with consciousness. 
The word “active” is quite general, and it is used here in a more restrictive sense than in related 
work where the term is also used. In particular, approaches stressing homeostasis and autopoiesis (Di 
Paolo 2005) view an organism that is autonomous and adaptive, and that appears to act on its own 
behalf (Kauffman 2003), as having agency and being active. Similarly, in the free energy approach, 
when an organism maintains internal homeostasis by acting on its environment and modifying its 
sensory inputs, this is called active inference (essentially because it involves the part of the free 
energy formalism that describes action). However, systems described in these approaches will usually 
involve only regular deterministic and stochastic causation, which is called passive here (see also 
Sect. 5). Only the entangled form of causation described in Sect. 2, produced by a feedback loop 
involving estimated fitness and modulated stochastic causation, is called active here, and it is only that 
specific feedback loop, or more complex versions of it, that is able to generate genuine meaning (as an 
emergent property evolved by natural selection). 
The models presented here took inspiration from so-called two-stage models of free will, 
proposed by many researchers going back at least to William James (reviewed in Doyle 2013). In 
these models, a first stage generates random behavioural options, one of which is subsequently 
selected by a deterministic second stage. Such models and variants of them (Tse 2013) are themselves 
inspired by Darwin's evolution theory, and conform to the model of Fig. 1a. They are therefore 
restricted to passive causation and do not embody intrinsic meaning, essentially because they do not 
let the randomness λ be a function of a self-estimated fitness fˆ , in a feedback loop and with fˆ  under 
evolutionary pressure to align itself with the true fitness f. A similar restriction applies to the theory of 
neuronal group selection (Edelman 1993) and to work in the functionalist tradition (e.g., Pugh 1976), 
which also conform to or rely on the basic Darwinian scheme, and therefore lack the active causation 
and intrinsic meaning produced by fˆ  in the extended behavioural scheme (Fig. 3, and Sect. 4, Fig. 7). 
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Complex feedbacks between evolution and development, and between how organisms shape 
their own environment and how that influences their subsequent evolution (Pigliucci and Müller 
2010), are occasionally presented in wording that suggests goal-directedness. However, without a 
specific term )ˆ(λ f  modulating randomness, such feedback schemes are elaborations of the basic 
Darwinian scheme of Fig. 1a, containing only passive causation. The goal-directedness and agency of 
the organism they suggest are therefore not genuine, but merely “as if”. 
It is sometimes assumed that any observed stochasticity in the world is not real, but only 
apparent, caused by a lack of complete knowledge of the underlying causes of the observables. The 
models and arguments presented in this article are agnostic with respect to the source and nature of 
the stochasticity required, and are therefore not affected by any such assumptions. Nevertheless, at a 
deeper level it might be argued that, if stochasticity is only apparent, the freedom provided by active 
causation is only apparent as well. I believe that such a view is likely to be mistaken for several 
reasons. First, the “as if”-stochasticity argument ignores quantum indeterminacy, which appears to be 
a genuine source of randomness. Second, the argument is often based on the theoretical assumption 
that current physical theories have unlimited validity, whereas these theories are known to be 
incomplete, and it is not clear how far they can be extrapolated beyond the range where they have 
been tested. Finally, in a classical, Newtonian universe, even Laplace's demon gets confused, within a 
tiny fraction of a second, if the whereabouts of merely a single electron are unknown (Berry 1988). 
Arguing that microscopic fluctuations cannot show at macroscopic scales because they average out is 
not valid either, because nonlinearities can easily amplify even the smallest indeterminacies to 
prominence (Berry 1988; Laskar and Gastineau 2009). 
The relationship between intrinsic meaning and fitness, as well as fitness itself, is highly 
complex in advanced organisms. Fitness extends to related organisms and organisms with shared 
interests, and depends on feedbacks through a malleable environment. The dual inheritance system in 
humans (molecular heredity alongside cultural inheritance) further complicates matters (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Boyd et al. 2011), as cultural flexibility makes human fitness a moving target. Fully 
reducing human meaning to fitness is therefore almost certainly intractable (Anderson 1972), although 
it may be possible to derive broad generalities relating the two. This article does indeed not intend to 
advocate such a reduction, but rather to show how the phenomena of meaning and goal-directed 
initiative can be understood, at least in principle, from existing scientific knowledge. 
 
4 Methods 
 
4.1 Basic model (Fig. 1a) 
 
For simplicity, n(h,t) is taken to be continuous. The dynamics of the primary feedback loop I is 
governed by a first-order low-pass filter with time constant τH 
),()),(),((),(τH thnthnthfdt
thdn
−∗Λ= ,    (1) 
where the asterisk denotes convolution along the h-coordinate. Λ is a normalized Gaussian with 
coordinate h and standard deviation λH. Fitness is given by  
)/)(exp()2/))((exp(),( 2E2max KtNtEhfthf −−−= σ ,    (2) 
with ∑= h thntN ),()( ,  fmax the maximum fitness, σE determining the width of the fitness function, and 
K the carrying capacity of the environment (for simplicity not taken as a hard limit, but one that produces 
a gradually decreasing fitness). For all calculations τH=100, fmax=3, σE=5, and  K=10000 are used (units 
in discrete time steps and units of h). The value of K is only nominal, because continuous n implies an 
effectively infinite population size. The environmental variable E(t) has units of h and is taken as filtered 
Gaussian white noise, using as filter a normalized sum of low-pass filters, with pulse response (for t≥0; 
for t<0 h(t)=0) given by 
∑
=
−
=
k
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The noise is generated with a standard deviation of 1000 per time step, and the filter parameters are 
τz=4, r=4, k=6, and q=1. Figure 4a shows an example of E(t) (for computational convenience shifted 
to positive values only), and Fig. 4b its power spectral density. The latter follows approximately a 
power law, with a slope of about -1.8. The power-law behaviour reverts to a flat spectrum for 
frequencies much smaller than 1/τ6 (=1/4096; not shown in the figure), which means that the power 
spectral density is integrable. For the results presented in 
this article, the precise form of E(t), for example as steered 
by q, is not critical, as long as it contains sufficient power 
at low frequencies such that adaptation of h with a 
relaxation time τH increases fitness, and at the same time 
sufficient power at high frequencies such that adaptation of 
b with a relaxation time τB increases fitness as well. 
In the calculations, heredity h is discretized to integer 
values, and calculations are started with K organisms 
(either in one population or evenly divided between two 
populations) of type h=E(0) convolved with Λ. Low-pass 
filters (here and below) are implemented as autoregressive 
filters yi=f1yi-1+f2xi, with x input, y output, and the 
coefficients given by f1=exp(-1/τ) and f2=1-f1 (van Hateren 
2008). Models are implemented in R, with calls to Fortran 
routines at places critical to keep computation times 
manageable. Sources are available at 
https://sites.google.com/site/jhvanhateren/ or upon request 
from the author. 
Simulations show that for basic Darwinian evolution 
populations can adapt to E(t), provided the mutation rate 
λH is chosen suitably. However, if λH is chosen too small, 
fast changes in E(t), which occur unpredictably, strongly 
reduce the population size because the new types h 
required are not generated fast enough. If λH is chosen too 
large, types h that are well adapted to E(t) mutate away too 
quickly, again strongly reducing the population size. For 
the E(t) used here, a value of λH=2 was found to be close to 
optimal to sustain a viable population, and this value is therefore used as default for simulations with 
fixed λH. 
The overall structure of the model has some resemblance to the quasispecies theory of Eigen and 
Schuster (1977) and other approaches to evolutionary dynamics (Page and Nowak 2002), but is 
different in details. In particular the way heredity and changes in heredity are handled and the 
relationship between E(t), h, and fitness are highly simplified, with mutations, though undirected, 
always on the same scale as h and E(t) and therefore never completely lethal (but possibly of low 
fitness).  
 
4.2 Extended model (Fig. 1c, d) 
 
As a reasonable choice an inverse relationship between Hˆf  and λH is used with empirically chosen 
parameter values that proved to work well. Quite likely, other relationships and different parameter 
values will work even better, but as the aim of the model computations is only to provide a proof of 
concept, and the model is a mere toy model, this was not investigated further. The default value of 
λH=2.0 is multiplied by a factor as 
)1.0ˆ/(8.10.2)ˆ(λ HHH +×= ff ,     (6)  
Fig. 4 Properties of environmental 
variable E. (a) Example of E(t) for 8192 
time steps. (b) Power spectral density of 
E(t), periodogram average of the spectra 
of 100 realizations of E(t) of length 8192 
time steps each; a.u.: arbitrary units 
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which is a factor fairly close to one for values of the fitness Hˆf  in the typical high fitness range of 
1.3-2.3, and fairly large (limited by the 0.1 in the denominator) for values of Hˆf  close to zero. For 
large values of λH some of the resulting h values can fall beyond the range of h considered, and those 
organisms are removed from the computation (becoming extinct). For simplicity, the model 
calculations use an estimated fitness Hˆf  identical to the true fitness f, with similar assumptions for Bˆf  
and Mˆf  below. However, the model calculations are not very sensitive to this assumption: 
deliberately introducing errors in Hˆf  still produces results similar to those of Fig. 1d (in Eq. (2), with 
f as used for Hˆf  in Eq. (6), 10% increases or decreases of fmax or σE, or shifting h-E(t) by one unit, 
corresponding to errors in observing h or E(t)). 
Evolvability of the extended model (Fig. 1d) was evaluated as follows. Two populations 
nλ,modulated (according to the extended model) and nλ,fixed (according to the basic model) are interacting 
and competing by using as N in Eq. (2) N=Nλ,modulated+Nλ,fixed, with Nλ,modulated=Σhnλ,modulated and 
Nλ,fixed=Σhnλ,fixed. The figure shows the results of 100 such computations, with λH,modulated always 
according to Eq. (6) and λH,fixed systematically varied from 0.5 to 3.5. In all cases the extended model 
outperforms the basic model, yielding a ratio Nλ,fixed/ Nλ,modulated that fluctuates, but gradually declines 
with time. 
 
4.3 Trajectory version of the extended model (Fig. 2a) 
 
Figure 2a is the equivalent of Fig. 1c for individual h-trajectories. Collections of h-trajectories 
produce results consistent with the population calculations (as is also the case for the b-trajectories of 
the b- and m-models below). Trajectories are calculated alongside with the population n(h,t), from 
which N(t) is used for calculating fitness as needed for the trajectory calculations. Fitness determines 
the number of offspring by a Poisson random generator (Rpoisson, with parameter f), yielding 0, 1, 2, or 
more offspring (split arrows at ∆n in the figure). With ∆n=0 the trajectory (lineage) becomes extinct, 
and is removed from the computation. With ∆n=1 the trajectory just continues (with a new step in 
heredity ∆h , thus h becomes h+∆h, where the new h lasts for a time ∆tH before new offspring is 
generated). With ∆n>1 the trajectory splits in two or more, each of which trajectories is subsequently 
treated separately. The steps in heredity are generated by a normal (Gaussian) random generator 
(Rnormal, with parameter λH), and the lifetime ∆tH by an exponential random generator (Rexp, with 
parameter τH). Such a random process is the equivalent of the first-order low-pass filter in the 
population model (symbolized by τH in Fig. 1c). 
 
4.4 Likelihood ratio of h-trajectories (Fig. 2b) 
 
The likelihood ratio as a function of time t is calculated as the product Π∆hP(∆h| λH,modulated)/ P(∆h| 
λH,fixed) over all steps ∆h of a particular trajectory up to time t. Whereas P(∆h|λH,modulated) is given by a 
normal distribution with standard deviation λ according to Eq. (6), the choice of λH,fixed is somewhat 
arbitrary, but influences the likelihood ratio. Therefore the λH,fixed producing the minimum mean end 
value of the likelihood ratios of all h-trajectories computed in a simulation was determined 
numerically, and that value of λH,fixed is used for the figure.  
Because the mathematical forms of P(∆h| λH,modulated) and P(∆h| λH,fixed)  are known (both 
Gaussians), it is possible to compute an expected likelihood ratio function B(t). This only requires 
λH,modulated as a function of time rather than the series of random realizations of ∆h produced by the 
Rnormal of Fig. 2a. We write λ0 for λH,fixed and λi, i=1..L for the successive λH,modulated of L organisms in a 
trajectory, and we need to integrate over P(∆h1,..,∆hL|λ1,..,λL) if the ∆hi are actually produced by the 
extended scheme: 
13 
 
( )
( )
(7)                                                                                                   .
λ
λ
2
1
2
1
λ
λlog
λ2
1
λ2
1)(
λ
λlog)λ2/)(exp(
λπ2
1
)λ|(/)λ|(log)λ|()...λ|(
)λ|(/)λ|(log)λ|()...λ|()log(
1
2
0
2
i0
2
0
2
i
202
i
2
1
1
0111
1
0111
∑
∑∫
∑∫∫
∏∫∫
=
=
=
=








+−=
















−∆−∆−∆=








∆∆∆∆∆∆=








∆∆∆∆∆∆=
L
i i
i
i
i
i
L
i
i
L
i
iiiLLL
L
i
iiiLLL
hhhd
hPhPhPhdhPhd
hPhPhPhdhPhdB
 
 
The result gives the expected natural logarithm of the likelihood ratio, which is converted to the 
logarithm base 10 for the figure. 
 
4.5 Extended model with behaviour (Fig. 3a, b) 
 
Fitness is now given by 
)/)(exp()2/))((exp(),( 2E2max KtNtEbhfthf −−+−= σ ,    (8) 
with the probability of b for each h given by P(b|h,t). The h-loop on the left of Fig. 3a uses a fitness 
estimate ),,(ˆH tbhf , but eventually produces n(h,t) as summed over b. With P(b|h,t) this is 
subsequently converted to n(h,b,t)= n(h,t)P(b|h,t). Typical lifetime of a behaviour b is τB (defaulted to 
4), and new b are generated by convolution with a normalized Gaussian with standard deviation λB. 
Calculations are started with the population at b=0 convolved with this Gaussian. For the modulated 
scheme λB is driven by a fitness estimate ),,(ˆB tbhf  according to 
)1.0ˆ/(8.15.0)ˆ(λ BBB +×= ff ,     (9) 
again determined empirically as a suitable choice. The allowed range of b is taken as -bmax..bmax. If 
bmax is small compared with σE and λH, behaviour has little effect on fitness, and all adaptation occurs 
by changes in h. If bmax is large, all adaptation can be done quickly by behavioural changes, and the 
distribution over h will tend to change little. A choice of bmax=10 produces a well balanced 
combination of h and b adaptations, and is used in the calculations. When convolution with λB 
produces values of b beyond the allowed range, values are replaced as in circular convolution 
(continuing on the other side of the range). Qualitatively similar results are obtained when folding b 
back as if reflected at the boundary of the allowed range. 
For computing the likelihood ratios of b-trajectories the same methods were used as described 
above for Fig. 2b. The equivalent of Fig. 3a for trajectories (Fig. 5) shows how b-trajectories are 
generated within each h-trajectory. For simplicity, the trajectories are generated asynchronously, as is 
implicitly the case for the population model of Fig. 3a as well. This implies that a new h-trajectory 
may continue, for a relatively short time (τB=4 relative to τH=100), with the previous b value, which 
subsequently can diffuse away quickly to other b values.  
 
Fig. 5 Equivalent of Fig. 3a 
(which provides N) for 
computing single h- and b-
trajectories, with a b-trajectory 
the trajectory (through 
behavioural space) of 
consecutive behaviours of a 
particular organism. R are 
random generators. Details are 
given in Sect. 4.5 
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4.6 Evolvability of the modulated behavioural model (Fig. 6) 
 
Two populations nλ,modulated (according to the model with modulated λB and modulated λH) and nλ,fixed 
(according to the model with fixed λB, but modulated λH) are interacting and competing by using as N 
in Eq. (8) N=Nλ,modulated+Nλ,fixed. The figure shows the results of 100 such computations, with λB,modulated 
always according to Eq. (9) and λB,fixed systematically varied from 0.01 to 0.6. In all cases the 
modulated model outperforms the fixed model. The limit for small λB,fixed is in fact identical to the 
model without behavioural adaptations (Fig. 1c), which indicates that the ability to produce 
behavioural adaptations is evolvable (depending on the fitness costs of behaviour, such as more 
resources needed for operation, longer maturation times, and so on). 
 
 
 
4.7 Trajectory version of the motor planning model and b-trajectories (Figs. 9 and 10) 
 
Figure 9 shows how first P(m|h,t) is generated (in parallel, because there is no requirement to generate 
serial trajectories as all operations take place within individual organisms). P(m|h,t) is subsequently 
converted to P(b|h,t) through the behavioural low-pass filter τB, and from P(b|h,t) b-trajectories are 
generated within each h-trajectory. For computing the likelihood ratios of b-trajectories (Fig. 10) only 
Fig. 6 Ratios of population numbers N of 100 pairs of 
competing populations, one always following the model of 
Fig. 3a (with λB,modulated) and the other the corresponding 
model with fixed λB, over a range of λB,fixed. Results after 
30τH (open grey symbols) and 60τH (black dots). The 
results show that the extended model is evolvable also for 
behaviour. Details are given in Sec. 4.6 
 
Fig. 7 Motor planning extension of active 
causation. The probability density of motor 
plan m for each h is varied through )ˆ(λ MM f , 
with ),,(ˆM tmhf  fitness estimated by the 
organism. P(b|h,t) is a low-pass filtered 
version (with τB>τM) of P(m|h,t). Because the 
motor planning is simulated, and can be 
implemented in parallel in the nervous system, 
it can be faster than actual behaviour, and the 
effect of a specific behaviour can be 
simulated, based on ),,(ˆM tmhf , before it is 
actually executed. For the calculations, 
defaults are τM=1, τB=4, and τH=100 
 
Fig. 8 Ratios of population numbers N of 100 pairs of 
competing populations, one always following the model of 
Fig. 7 (with λM,modulated) and the other the corresponding 
model with fixed λM, over a range of λM,fixed. Results after 
20τH (open grey symbols) and 40τH (black dots). The results 
show that the extended model is evolvable also for planned 
behaviour 
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the direct method Π∆bP(∆b| λM,modulated)/ P(∆b| λM,fixed) could be used (not the expected B(t) as in Eq. 
(7)), because there is no analytical expression for P(m|h,t) available. Planned behaviour m is evaluated 
as ),,(ˆM tmhf  and produces λM according to Eq. (9) (with B replaced by M). The typical lifetime of m 
is τM=1. 
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5 Appendix: Terminology 
 
Several of the terms used in this article, such as “meaning”, “active”, and “freedom” are veterans of 
natural language for describing human affairs, and they are therefore, as common in natural language, 
somewhat broad, vague, and ambiguous. In this section I will try to explain a bit more accurately than 
in the main text as to how I use them, in order to reduce their ambiguity within the present context. 
The main point of this article is that an internalized fitness estimate, fˆ , is used in feedback 
loops as in Fig. 1c and Fig. 3a for modulating hereditary and behavioural variability. This estimate 
and its form represent what is designated by the term “intrinsic meaning”. This use of the word 
“meaning” is close to that given by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED online, accessed May 22, 
2014) as [meaning, n.2, 1], for example as used in expressions like the meaning of an action or the 
meaning of life. It implies significance, import, value, and purpose. Such a broad spectrum of 
denotations is appropriate here, because using fˆ  is presumably a feature of all forms of life (van 
Hateren 2013), and it represents at the same time a goal-directedness (as in life striving for high 
fitness in order to survive and reproduce), a value in the form of high fitness, and, through the form of 
fˆ  (i.e., of which parameters it is a function, and in what form) which aspects of the environment and 
itself the organism takes into account for estimating its own fitness. Those aspects are the ones that 
represent significance and import to the organism. For most organisms the goal-directedness is merely 
Fig. 9 Equivalent of Fig. 7 (which provides N) for computing single h- and b-trajectories. R 
are random generators. Because m is computed and evaluated within single organisms, the 
model performs that part of the computation in parallel. The computation of h and b is serial 
as before. For details see Sect. 4.7 
Fig. 10 The likelihood ratios of b-trajectories, computed with 
the m-model of Fig. 9 as Π∆bP(∆b| λM,modulated)/ P(∆b| λM,fixed), 
typically rise to high values. Shown are observed ratios of all 
b-trajectories in an 5τH interval of three different h-trajectories. 
The increasing likelihood ratios show that b-trajectories 
gradually become nearly completely determined by the goal 
function Mˆf , even if this only involves a neural simulation, 
made by the organism, of random behavioural changes. For 
details see Sect. 4.7 
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an implicit drive in the direction of appropriate, though underdetermined end-points (together 
producing high fitness). However, in organisms where fˆ  becomes so complicated and flexible that it 
gives rise to planned behaviour (Figs. 7 and 9), consciousness, and language (van Hateren 2014), end-
points may be produced by simulation or even conscious deliberation, and thus evolve into genuine 
purposes. 
It is important to stress that “meaning” is used here not in the more narrow linguistic sense as in 
the meaning (signification) of a word [OED, meaning n.2, 2], and also not as a means for 
categorization and symbolic generalization. Nevertheless, it is likely that this more narrow sense can 
be understood as derivable from the broad sense, as the end result of an as yet not completely resolved 
chain of reasoning (sketched in van Hateren 2014). The term “intrinsic meaning” is also different 
from “value” in the sense of the variable defining a value-driven decision process: “intrinsic meaning” 
is not a single number, but includes the form of the estimated fitness function and the fact that there is 
an implicit drive towards high estimated fitness. 
Apart from “intrinsic meaning”, the feedback loops of Fig. 1d and Fig. 3 also give rise to a 
special form of causation, because stochasticity is continually modulated by the goal-directedness of 
fˆ  and thus produces hereditary and behavioural trajectories that are unpredictable, but not random. 
This form of causation is designated by the term “active causation”, with the meaning of “active” 
close to that given in [OED, active, 2], i.e., capable of acting on something, originating action, 
spontaneous, voluntary. Active causation is contrasted with deterministic causation, which cannot 
originate anything new because systems subject to deterministic causation passively follow internal or 
external influences, like a clockwork. It is also contrasted with stochastic causation, which does 
originate new events and does so spontaneously (not caused by internal or external influences), but 
cannot be seen as producing action (because it lacks a goal-directedness) nor doing so voluntarily 
(because it lacks purpose). Both deterministic and stochastic causation are therefore designated by the 
term “passive causation” here, because either lacks several of the defining characteristics of “active”. 
The feedback loops of Fig. 1c and Fig. 3a entangle deterministic and stochastic causation in such a 
way that all defining characteristics of “active” are produced: there is the capability to originate and 
initiate in a spontaneous way (because of the stochasticity), but also in a way that can be seen as 
acting and performing action, because of the intrinsic goal-directedness produced by the feedback 
loops. For advanced organisms with reasoning and consciousness (van Hateren 2014), the acts can be 
deliberate and voluntary.  
The ability to originate and perform action is a form of “freedom” for the organism, because its 
behaviour is neither dictated by a determined chain of causation, nor by the arbitrariness of 
randomness. This sense of freedom is close to [OED, freedom, 5], i.e., the power of self-
determination (but without the mental or spiritual connotations), which can be seen as an absence of 
necessity [OED, necessity, 2], i.e., an absence of “constraint or compulsion having its basis in the 
natural order or constitution of things, esp. such constraint perceived as a law prevailing throughout 
the material universe and within the sphere of human action.”  
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